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The benefit system has created a benefit culture. It doesn't just allow people 
to act irresponsibly, but often actively encourages them to do so (David 
Cameron, Conservative Prime-Minister, 2011) 
 
We are not the party of people on benefits. We don’t want to be seen [as], 
and we’re not, the party to represent those who are out of work (Rachel 
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In the aftermath of the global banking crises, a political economy of permanent state 
austerity has emerged, driven by and legitimated through a hardening anti-welfare 
commonsense. We argue that, while there is an excellent evidence base emerging 
around solidifying negative public attitudes towards welfare, critical policy studies 
needs to attend to the cultural as well as the political economies through which an 
anti-welfare commonsense is formed and legitimated. To this end, in this article we 
adopt a ‘cultural political economy’ (Jessop, 2010; Sum & Jessop, 2013) approach to 
examine the co-production of the Welfare Reform Act (2012), (and in particular the 
Household Benefits Cap element of this legislation), and the cultural and political 
crafting of “benefit brood” families within the wider public sphere, to examine the 
mechanisms through which anti-welfare sentiments are produced and mediated. Our 
analysis begins with the case of Mick Philpott, who was found guilty in 2013 of the 
manslaughter of six of his children. We will show how this case activated 
‘mechanisms of consent’ (Hall et al. 1978: 214) around ideas of acceptable family 
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forms, welfare reform and parental responsibility.  Through this case-study, we seek 
to demonstrate how anti-welfare commonsense is fundamentally dependent upon 
wider cultural representational practices, through which those who claim welfare 
come to be constituted as undeserving and morally repugnant, to the extent that the 
very concept of ‘claiming welfare’ is reconceived within the social imaginary as 
debauched. Figures such as ‘benefits broods’, we argue, operate both as 
technologies of control (through which to manage precariat populations), but also as 
technologies of consent through which a wider and deeper anti-welfare 
commonsense is effected. 
 
 
Introduction: Anti-Welfare Commonsense 
 
It is difficult to remember from a contemporary perspective that the Keynesian 
welfare state was imagined by its original architects as a ‘cradle to grave’ safety-net 
for citizens: a ‘welfare commons’ of ‘shared risks’ which would function to ameliorate 
economic and social hardships, injustices and inequalities (see Timmins 2001; Lowe 
2005; Glennerster 2007). The landmark publication of the Beveridge Report in 1942 
saw people queuing outside government offices in their desire to get their hands on a 
copy of this blueprint for a new welfare state (Page, 2007: 11) and the report sold 
over 100,000 copies within a month of its publication.  What this public excitement 
communicated was a deep and broad political and public desire for a new kind of 
social contract between citizens and state.  As Pat Starkey notes, this idealized 
welfarist imaginary portrayed ‘a unanimity of aspiration across class boundaries for 
the reconstruction of British society, with its best features intact and its recent 
economic difficulties and unemployment absent’ (Starkey, 2000: 547). However, 
Starkey also reminds us that the welfare state was always a moral and disciplinary 
project, conditional upon certain kinds of ideal citizens and behaviours and grounded 
in classificatory distinctions between ‘deserving’ and ‘underserving’. As Fiona 
Williams has extensively detailed, unequal social relations, not only of class, but of 
gender, ‘race’, disability, age and sexuality, have always underpinned ‘welfare 
regimes, their outcomes, the organisation of labour […] the delivery of services, 
political pressures and ideologies and patterns of consumption’ (Williams 1994: 50). 
Indeed, what remains of the post-War welfare state today was indelibly shaped by 
struggles against disciplinary welfare regimes and against the forms of patriarchy 
and state-racism it reproduced. Nevertheless, writing in a context where democratic 
futurist welfare dreams have been consigned to history, when many forms of welfare 
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provisions are being cut, and those who claim benefits and entitlements have 
become deeply stigmatized, it is important to recall the powerful ideological 
commitment to welfare which transformed post-War British society. The transition to 
post-Keynesian welfare regime in the late 1970s has been well-documented in 
critical social policy studies (see for example Burrows and Loader eds. 1994; Jones 
and Novak, 1999; Ferguson, Lavalette and Mooney, 2002), with many noting that the 
Thatcherite assault on the welfare state, and the subsequent embrace of neoliberal 
policies by New Labour, has led to ‘deepening inequalities of income, health and life 
chances […] on a scale not seen since before the second World War’ (Hall, Massey 
and Rustin, 2014: 9). One of the major characteristics of welfare reform from the 
1970s onwards was the emergence of a consensus (across the political spectrum) 
that the welfare state was in ‘a permanent crisis’ (Langan, 1994: xi). Through this 
‘crisis lens’ the welfare state was reimagined as fostering toxic forms of ‘welfare 
dependency’ amongst citizens, itself considered to have a stagnating effect on 
economic growth and national prosperity. In a stunning reversal of the 1940s welfare 
imaginary, ‘welfare’ came to be understood across a wide-range of political, social 
and cultural milieus as a cause of poverty and social problems: including ‘inter-
generational worklessness’, drug dependence, anti-social behaviours, ‘troubled 
families’, teenage parenthood, crime and other ‘social ills’. Indeed, the idea that a 
‘bloated’ welfare state is responsible for the persistence of entrenched social 
problems ‘has led to measures of reform and retrenchment which have provoked 
often bitter controversy in virtually every sphere, from hospitals to schools to social 
security benefits’ (Langan, 1994: xi).  
More recently, in the aftermath of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (2008), a politics 
and policy of austerity has emerged across Europe, driven by global institutions such 
as the IMF in conjunction with state-governments. The British Coalition Government 
(2010-2015) responded to this crisis by implementing ‘the deepest and most 
precipitate cuts ever made in social provision’ (Taylor-Goodby, 2013: viii). An 
emerging body of evidence demonstrates that the most severe cuts to state welfare 
are to the benefits of working age families, notably women, children and disabled 
peoplei. As Taylor-Gooby argues, ‘It is hard to avoid the impression that some […] in 
government are seizing an opportunity to implement policies which deepen social 
divisions and undermine the  contribution  of  common  social  provision […] to  social  
cohesion’ (2013: viii). 
A Cultural Political Economy Approach 
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In this article, we will develop existing theoretical insights into the formation of post-
Keynesian welfare regimes through an explicit focus on the mechanisms through 
which anti-welfare commonsense is legitimated. The question of ‘consent’, and the 
revitalisation of the related concepts of ideology and hegemony, have become areas 
of renewed focus in critical policy studies, as scholars try to make sense of the 
persistence of neoliberal political and economic imaginaries, and correlative modes 
of governmentality, in the wake of the 2008 North Atlantic Financial crises (see for 
example Jessop, 2010; Davies, 2011; Hall, 2011; Rehmann, 2013; Sum and Jessop, 
2013, Newman, 2014; Schmidt and Thatcher 2014). As Vivien Schmidt and Mark 
Thatcher (2014) ask: why are neoliberal ideas so resilient in Europe’s political 
economy? This question is now urgent as since the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
failure (and subsequent ‘artificial’ resuscitation by state governments) of the core 
organs and institutions of financial capital, programmes of welfare reform are being 
significantly accelerated. As welfare programmes are cut, privatized and marketised 
it is increasingly unclear what elements of the British state welfare will remain. 
As Bob Jessop argues, in order to understand the persistence and popularity of 
neoliberal ideas, and the idea that ‘there is no alternative’, we need to examine 
critically how neoliberal ideologies, such as an anti-welfare commonsense, are 
‘anchored in (and help to anchor) specific social practices, organizational routines 
and institutions, and/or [are] partly constitutive of specific social identities in the wider 
society’ (Jessop, 2014: 355). To this end, Jessop (2010) (and see Sum & Jessop, 
2013) set out a compelling case for forms of critical policy scholarship that combine 
‘critical semiotic analysis’ and insights from ‘the cultural turn’, with orthodox political 
economy approaches drawn primarily from economics, sociology and political 
science. What Jessop recognizes is a need within critical policy studies for attention 
to the role of culture in the formation of economic and social imaginaries. As he 
notes: 
[I]n emphasizing the foundational nature of meaning and meaning-making in 
social relations, [cultural political economy] does not seek to add ‘culture’ to 
economics and politics as if each comprised a distinct area of social life [but 
rather] stresses the semiotic nature of all social relations (2010: 337).  
For Jessop then, a cultural political economy approach is concerned not only with 
how a neoliberal cultural imaginary provides ‘a semiotic frame for construing the 
world’ but also how such an imaginary actively contributes ‘to its construction’ (2010: 
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342).  Jessop’s intervention is highly redolent of an earlier period of British Cultural 
Studies, notably Stuart Hall et .al’s. Policing the Crisis (1978). What Hall and his 
colleagues recognised is that the commonsense of public opinion is tacit knowledge 
– hard to pin down in the moment of its formation, often leaving no inventory once it 
has dissipated – but nonetheless the formation of such commonsense is central to 
hegemonic power.  To examine the persistence and popularity of anti-welfare 
commonsense, we need to ‘pin-down’ how an understanding of welfare as ‘the 
cause’ of social problems, is mediated, reproduced and legitimated. That is, we need 
to examine the forms of ‘sense-making’ that anti-welfarism enables and produces, 
and the ways in which this sensibility is anchored in everyday belief-systems and 
practices. In what follows, we develop a cultural political economy approach to 
understanding the cultural ‘mechanisms of consent’ (Hall et al. 2013 [1978]: 207) 
through which public acquiescence to accelerated welfare reform is enabled and 
legitimated.  What forms of ‘coercion, consent and resistance’ characterize the anti-
welfare hegemony of the political present tense? (Davies 2011: 103). What  
‘mechanisms of consent’ are deployed to secure such unprecedented levels of anti-
welfare sentiment which legitimate the shift from welfarist to corporatist state 
formation; formations which exacerbate inequalities and punish vulnerable 
populations?  
The focus of our analysis is one of the key figures of anti-welfare commonsense, ‘the 
benefits brood’ family.  We focus in particular on the co-production of ‘benefits 
broods’ across cultural and political sites of mediation in 2013, when an intensive 
focus on particular kinds of families within the news media and popular culture 
became intertwined with debates about the Welfare Reform Act (2012), and 
specifically the Household Benefit Cap component of this Act, within the public 
sphere. We examine the ways in which ‘benefits broods’ came to function as a 
‘technology of consent’ for a deeper political programme of welfare reform. 
 
Our analysis begins with the case of Mick Philpott, found guilty in 2013 of the 
manslaughter of six of his children. We will show how this case activated 
‘mechanisms of consent’ around ideas of acceptable family forms and welfare 
reform. This was spectacularly realised in April 2013 when the Chancellor George 
Osborne directly linked the Philpott case to excessively generous child benefit and 
welfare payments.  Figures such as ‘benefits broods’, we argue, are culturally and 
politically crafted to play a central role in neoliberal policy formation, operating both 
6	  	  
as technologies of control (through which to manage precariat populations), but also 
as technologies of consent through which an anti-welfare commonsense is effected. 
 
Crafting Commonsense: The Philpott Case 
 
On April the 2nd 2013, a jury at Nottingham Crown Court found Michael Philpott guilty 
of manslaughter by setting a blaze at his home in Derby which took the lives of six of 
his children; thirteen-year-old Duwayne, ten-year-old Jade, nine-year-old John, eight-
year-old Jack, six-year-old Jesse and five-year-old Jayden. Philpott had led a plot, 
along with his wife Mairead Philpott and friend Paul Mosley, to frame his ex-girlfriend 
Lisa Willis for arson. Philpott’s objective appeared to be acquiring custody over their 
children. In sentencing Philpott, the judge, Mrs Justice Thirlwall, described his 
actions as “callous stupidity” (R -v- Philpott, Philpott & Mosley, 2013: 5). She 
described Philpott as a controlling misogynist and a “disturbingly dangerous man” 
who used violence and psychological abuse to dominate and control the women in 
his life. The legal judgement was very clear about the misogynistic abuse Michael 
Philpott had subjected his girlfriends and wife to, noting that Willis had fled to a 
women’s refuge with her children and that Mairead was in “a form of enslavement” 
(ibid).  The chief executive of Women’s Aidii, Polly Neate, described Philpott as a 
serial perpetrator of domestic violence and suggested that the case “lifted the lid” on 
domestic abuse (see Neate, 2013). However, the dimensions of gender-based 
violence that underpinned this case were erased in the media reporting.   
 
The day after the verdict, it was not the ‘domestic abuse’ that took centre stage in the 
media narration of this tragic case, but rather the ‘welfare abuse’ apparently enacted 
by the entire Philpott family.  The Daily Mail, for example, led with the headline ‘Vile 
Product of Welfare UK’ (April 3, 2012) and a family photograph of Philpott posing 







Figure 1, Front Page of the Daily Mail, Wednesday April 3rd 2013 [photograph of 
cover taken by Imogen Tyler]. 
 
In the Daily Mail account, Philpott was motivated purely by economic greed.  The 
Daily Mail narrates Philpott’s plot as an attempt to restore the ‘thousand pounds a 
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month of benefits’ that Willis ‘brought in’ and to secure a bigger council house, and 
states that he treated his children as ‘cash cows’ (see Dolan and Bentley, 2013).  
This narrative quickly gained media traction and on April 4th The Sun ran an editorial 
titled ‘In the Gutter’, reflecting that:  
 
It’s hard to imagine a more repulsive creature than Mick Philpott, the lowlife 
benefits scrounger convicted of killing six of his children in a fire.  
And who paid for his disgusting lifestyle? We did. Philpott may be the dregs of 
humanity. But the welfare system helped him every step of the way. 
Thousands a month in handouts flowed into the council home […] The more 
children he produced, the richer the State made him. He fathered 17 while 
dodging work and sponging off partners. He grasped every benefit going 
while demanding bigger council houses for his tribe.  
Was such feckless greed what the founding fathers of the welfare state 
intended to promote? (The Sun Says, 2013, our emphasis) 
 
This Sun editorial advises the reader (and ‘those who oppose welfare reform’) of the 
‘lessons’ of the case: ‘when benefits are so generous, easily obtainable and dished 
out indiscriminately, they can debase humanity’ (ibid.).  In their Leader on the 3rd of 
April, The Sun made even more powerful implicatory comments about the alleged 
causal relationship between social security, child benefit levels and the Philpott case, 
concluding ‘let’s hope this is the last time the state unwittingly subsidises the 
manslaughter of children’. This final line was edited in later editions of the newspaper 
to read ‘unwittingly subsidises a monster like Philpott’. 
 
The positing of a causal relationship between excessive benefit levels and the 
manslaughter of the Philpott children was not restricted to reports in the tabloid 
press.  On April 3rd the broadsheet newspaper The Daily Telegraph led with an article 
by Allison Pearson titled ‘Mick Philpott, a good reason to cut benefits’ and subtitled 
‘something has gone awry when skivers like Mick Philpott feel all-powerful and 
society cannot summon the moral will to say “No. Enough”’ (Pearson, 2013). 
Pearson described the Philpott household as a ’child benefit farm‘ and concluded by 
asking: “if child benefit was stopped after the third baby, would so many have been 
born to suffer and die?” On April 4th, in an editorial titled ‘Family Value’, The Times 
described Philpott as a ‘violent fool’ who was ‘milking the system’ and whose 
‘reckless choices’ were ‘subsidised by the rest of the nation’ (The Times, 2013).  The 
Times leader concluded that it is time to ‘look again’ at proposals to limit or cap Child 
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Benefit payments to the first two children only, echoing calls made in the House of 
Commons as the Welfare Reform Bill (2012) was making its way through the 
parliamentary system.  
 
A news media consensus was solidifying, in which the Philpotts had been adding 
children to their family, and had hatched an arson plot, in order to extract the 
maximum amount of welfare benefits from the state and to acquire a larger council 
house. A corresponding consensus was also consolidating, namely that the Philpott 
household was indicative of a corrupt benefits system, that was failing to inculcate 
individual responsibility in its citizens and which was encouraging particular kinds of 
large families to adopt a “welfare lifestyle”. 
This consensus was amplified, and transformed into political capital, on April 4th 
2013, with public remarks made by George Osborne , Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and a key architect of the Welfare Reform Bill  (2012).  Osborne, who was on a tour 
of the Royal Crown Derby porcelain works, stated that: 
Philpott is responsible for these absolutely horrendous crimes and these are 
crimes that have shocked the nation; the courts are responsible for 
sentencing him.  But I think there is a question for government and for society 
about the welfare state - and the taxpayers who pay for the welfare state - 
subsidising lifestyles like that, and I think that debate needs to be had. 
[Osborne cited in Tapsfield, 2013, emphasis added] 
Prime Minister David Cameron later defended Osborne’s comments, insisting that 
‘we should ask some wider questions about our welfare system, how much it costs 
and the signals it sends’ (in Mason and Dominiczak, 2013).  He added that ‘welfare is 
only there to help people who work hard and should not be used as a “life 
choice”(ibid.). The expedient use of the Philpott case by politicians and policymakers, 
to legitimate and extend their commitment to welfare retrenchment, demonstrates a 
longer history of neoliberal experimentation, policy-making and thinking, whereby the 
underlying problem to be solved in post-industrial states is the ‘condition of ‘‘welfare 
dependency,” rather than poverty per se’ (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 196). These 
comments highlight the cultural and political formation of anti-welfare commonsense, 
via the production and proliferation of a particular figure, the ‘benefit brood’ family. 
 
Weaponising ‘benefit broods’: a cultural economy of disgust 
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According to his biographer Janan Ganesh, George Osborne believes that it is 
important to ’weaponise policy‘ so it can be deployed for political ends (Ganesh, 
2012). Writing in The Daily Telegraph in 2014, the journalist Isobel Hardman 
discussed ‘the Chancellor’s desire to “‘weaponise” welfare policy’ (Hardman, 2014). 
We can clearly see how the Philpott case became ‘weaponised’ as part of an 
ideological arsenal in anti-welfare commonsense.  Media commentators and 
politicians congregated around the Philpott case and positioned it as emblematic of a 
wider social problem of ‘welfare dependency’ and excessively generous welfare 
benefits. The amount of money coming into the Philpott household was repeatedly 
and forensically charted in the days and weeks following the conviction – and often 
wildly distorted. Pearson (2013) writing in The Telegraph, declared that the Philpotts 
received ‘two thousand pounds plus a month in child benefit thanks to his extensive 
brood’; inflating the true figure by three times.  Other estimates were less precise, but 
no less revealing: an editorial in The Sun on 4th April created a vision of easy money 
when stating that ‘thousands of pounds a month in handouts flowed into the council 
house’ (The Sun, 2013). The most widely reported figures were between fifty and 
sixty thousand pounds a year, but even this was soon revised up, using a crude 
taxation calculation. In a typical example, Mark Duell and Simon Tomlinson in the 
Daily Mail stated that Philpott ‘claimed the equivalent of a £100,000 salary in 
benefits’ (Duell and Tomlinson, 2013). 
 
In becoming ‘weaponised’ in this way, the actual material and financial 
circumstances of the Philpott household income recede as the household comes to 
function as a figure of “welfare disgust”. Philpott himself did not actually claim any 
benefits, and the itemised household income includes the wages that his wife and 
girlfriend earned as cleaners, family tax credits, housing benefits and child benefits.  
Similarly, the overcrowding of their three-bedroom semi-detached house (home to 
eight children and three adults) becomes overshadowed by the material possessions 
within it, such as the family snooker table, which are cast as symbols of opulence.  
We argue that the fabrication of the Philpott household as a ‘child benefit farm’ is not 
an incidental media caprice, but is part of a much broader cultural political economy 
of ‘welfare disgust’.   
 
The Philpotts are just one spectacular example of an abjectified large family, but the 
cultural economy of disgust within which this example is anchored, is expansive, 
capacious and multi-sited.  The speed with which the Philpott conviction was re-
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narrated, mediated and circulated within public culture reveals a broader pre-existing 
architecture of mediations around what we have called the ‘benefit brood’ family.  
‘Benefit brood’ is a cultural figurations of disgust aimed at families which are deemed 
to have become ‘excessively’ large as a result of over-generous welfare entitlements; 
‘benefit brood’ parents regarded as almost pathologically fertile in their desire to 
secure greater amounts of welfare payments by having more and more children.  
‘Benefit brood’ narratives form a staple of disgust across news media, lifestyle and 
‘real life’ magazines, and pseudo-documentary (reality) television such as the genre 
of ‘poverty porn’.  Indeed, ‘poverty porn’ television in particular has emerged as a 
crucial site for repetitive mediations of the ‘benefit brood’ family (see Jensen, 2014; 
MacDonald, Shildrick and Furlong, 2014; Allen, Tyler and De Benedictis, 2014).  
Tracking the movement of ‘benefit brood’ families across these different media sites, 
we see that the same families are constantly circulating through a cultural economy 
of disgust; from magazine exposé, to newspaper article, to television production, and 
back again (see for example the recycling of the same ‘benefit brood’ families in 
Platell, 2010; Sims, 2010; Peev, 2010; Chapman, 2010; Andrews, 2010; Jorsh, 2012; 
Chorley, 2014). Indeed, the Philpott family themselves had previously been part of 
this ‘benefit brood’ pseudo-celebrity circuit, having featured on television talkshow 
Jeremy Kyle and ‘poverty porn’ precursor Ann Widdecombe Versus the Benefits 
Culture (both 2007). 
 
The explosion of media coverage around ‘benefit brood’ families is a process of 
orchestration whereby informal ideologies around deficient parenting, welfare 
dependency and abject fertility are managed. The production and repetition of 
‘revolting subjects’ such as ‘benefits broods’ are a central mechanism through which 
anti-welfare commonsense is crafted (see Tyler 2013; Jensen, 2014). Through 
broader citations of large families as a ‘welfare problem’, the already-established 
‘disgust-consensus’ around ‘benefit broods’ families was rapidly anchored to the 
Philpotts specifically. The receipt of state welfare, hitherto marked as disgusting, and 
now linked repeatedly to the manslaughter of six children, becomes powerfully 
weaponised and in turn shapes public perceptions around state welfare in general. In 
the comment sections, message boards and letters pages that accompany such 
‘benefit brood’ mediations, we see the ‘awakened lay attitudes’ (Hall, 1978: 136) 
around welfare that are procured and crystallised through these representations.  
While a swell of revolted public opinion appears spontaneous, by approaching such 
figurations as in Hall et al.’s terms, ‘structured in dominance’, it is possible to discern 
the social and political formation of consent.  The ‘benefit brood’ family provides what 
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Hall et al. term the ‘lynch-pin of legitimation’, referring to those orchestrations of 
public opinion which provide tacit support for an already-circulating commonsense 
ideology about the welfare state and welfare dependency. 
 
‘Benefits broods’, along with the unemployed, irregular migrants, asylum seekers, 
come to function in this neoliberal order as ‘national abjects’ (Tyler, 2013), 
stigmatised figures who serve as “ideological conductors mobilised to do the dirty 
work of neoliberal governmentality” (Tyler, 2013: 9).  Such national abjects are 
constituted and repetitively accumulated in and through their movement through a 
range of media, cultural, social and political sites, becoming over-determined and 
caricatured, and thus shaping perceptual realities at multiple levels of social 
interchange, organizing public opinion and inciting consent for welfare 
retrenchement.  
 
Such orchestrations should, we argue, be seen as a cultural political economy of 
disgust, which operationalizes disgust as part of anti-welfare architecture.  Such 
architecture, or commonsense, not only procures consent for welfare reforms, but 
also in the process transforms abject populations such as ‘benefit brood’ families, 
into lucrative and electorally potent political capital. The public comments made by 
Osborne, and supported by Cameron, are a powerful example of the weaponisation 
of (welfare reform) policy by political elites.  By fuelling public hostilities towards 
populations imagined to be a parasitical drain on resources, these weaponised cases 
become ‘capable of swaying voters and disabling opponents who find them 
impossible to argue against convincingly’ (Ganesh, 2012).  
 
 
From the Nanny State to the Daddy State: the Household Benefits Cap 
 
It has been most encouraging to see how warmly the country has received 
our changes, particularly the £26,000 limit on families receiving benefits. The 
Philpott case was an eye-opener to many, highlighting that far too many 
people in this country are living a wholly immoral lifestyle on public finance, 
and we need to crack down on that. 
(Gerald Howarth, HC Deb 2 May 2013 GC388) 
 
In Britain it was under the New Labour Government (1997-2010) that the particular 
kinds of moral narratives about “problem families” and “poor parenting”, which 
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dominate public culture today, first emerged. New Labour introduced punitive policies 
deployed to manage “failed citizen-parents” by limiting financial aid and inculcating 
“responsibility” for their own welfare by finding work (see Jensen and Tyler, 2013). 
Parents were addressed as “partners” in a joint project with the government to raise 
aspirational children.  The welfare state was imagined across many policy 
documents and political speeches as if itself a parent in the enterprise of producing 
the citizens of tomorrow.  In many ways the optimism with which children and 
families were placed at the centre of political projects was refreshing: in one of his 
many parenting refrains, Tony Blair declared that ‘children might be twenty per cent 
of the population but they are one hundred per cent of the future’ (Blair, 1999).  At 
the same time, through the explosion of parenting intervention policies during this 
period a clear message emerged that deficit parenting was being practised by 
(some) families, who were wilfully “stuck” in bad habits and resistant to voluntary 
change (see for example DfES 2006 and 2007). Through intervening (by force if 
necessary) and transmitting the “right” skills, the state positioned itself as a “super 
nanny” who would remedy the social inequalities and divisions of the future 
(re)produced by families ‘unwilling or unable’ to effect change for themselves.  The 
consequent hostilities incited by this policy momentum towards ‘poor parents’ was 
particularly vengeful in relation to certain groups: those who live on council estates, 
receiving income support benefits, in irregular work and single mothers (Gillies, 
2007). 
 
The epithet “the Nanny State” was gleefully attached to the New Labour government 
by its critics, referring to their alleged micromanagement, hectoring policy, 
bureaucracy and undermining of personal responsibility (see for example 
Huntingdon, 2004). Where the New Labour “nanny state” was positioned as an 
abject maternal figure, inducing dependence and creating ‘feminized’ (that is, weak) 
workforces and a bloated and ‘Broken Britain’ (see Hanock & Mooney 2013, Slater 
2014), the current Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government has 
framed its welfare reform project as one that will withdraw “nanny state” succour and 
eradicate its associated pathologies.  In austerity Britain, we are told, citizens need to 
“re-learn” the lessons of hardy resilience, independence, motivation and personal 
responsibility in order for the nation to be able to compete again on a global scale.  
 
On the eve of the British General Election in 2010, Stephen Brien of the think-tank 
The Centre for Social Justice detailed the ‘lessons’ of a welfare Nanny State that 
would become central to effecting the Welfare Reform Act (2012). As he wrote: 
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Welfare dependency is one of the most pernicious problems facing modern 
Britain and its deprived communities.  When William Beveridge was planning 
the welfare state, he spoke about the giant evil of idleness: not just a waste of 
economic potential, but of human potential too. The tragedy is that his welfare 
system has gone on to incubate the very problem it was designed to 
eradicate.  It was intended to support those who were unable to work, or for 
whom there were no jobs.  But the benefits system now actively discourages 
people from taking a job, or working more hours.  For millions, welfare 
dependency is now a way of life (Brien, 2010) 
 
Loïc Wacquant argues that since the 1970s, liberal democracies of the global North 
have sought to transform from Keynesian ‘Nanny States’, to authoritarian ‘Daddy 
States’ (Wacquant 2010).  This shift, he argues, is characterised in policy by ‘the new 
priority given to duties over rights, sanction over support [and] the stern rhetoric of 
the “obligations of citizenship”’ (Wacquant, 2010: 201). The current Coalition 
government have explicitly positioned themselves as the ‘Daddy State’ inheritors and 
architects of tough welfare reform that the ‘Nanny State’ New Labour government 
were unable to effect.  This repositioning seems to have been successful, at least if 
we consult the hardening of public opinion towards unemployed people since the 
Coalition government was formed in 2010 (see Gooby-Taylor, 2013; Hills, 2015). 
One of the most enthusiastic embracers of the Daddy State rhetoric has been the 
Work and Pensions Secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, the architect of a matrix of welfare 
reforms that he has proudly described as “aggressive” (Duncan-Smith, 2013).  
Indeed in overseeing the Welfare Reform Act (2012), Duncan-Smith has positioned 
himself as the saviour of the welfare state, claiming that the previous Labour 
government ‘spent thirteen years letting the rot set into the welfare state, and I am 
now busy putting things right’ (Duncan-Smith, 2013).  One of the most salient 
examples of the tough welfare reform policy, which has particular relevance to the 
moralised significance of work/worklessness and the figure of the ‘benefits brood’, 
has been the ‘Household Benefit Cap’ element of this Act.    
 
As part of the Annual Spending Review in 2010 the Government announced its 
intention to cap total household benefits at £350 per week for a single person 
household and £500 per week for couples, with or without children, and single parent 
households. Households are exempt from the Cap if they move into paid 
employment.  According to the Impact Assessment for the cap, the rationale for 
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these calculations is to “restrict the total amount of money a non-working household 
can receive to broadly the level of the average earned income of working 
households” (DWP, 2012) – currently around twenty-six thousand pounds a year.  
This new welfare regime also requires that unemployed claimants sign a 
personalised “claimant commitment” which sets out the requirements and 
conditionalities for receiving welfare benefits and the consequences of not meeting 
them (see DWP, 2013). Failure to comply with these commitments, decided upon by 
your ‘work coach’, results in sanctions (such as loss of benefits for a fixed period), in 
order to ‘incentivise’ claimants.   
 
The Household Benefit Cap has antecedents in previous welfare policies, for 
example in the ‘wage stop’ of the Social Security Act 1966, whereby supplementary 
benefits for unemployed claimants could be reduced if their receipt would result in 
the total benefit payments exceeding the claimant’s ‘likely wage’.  However, unlike 
the ‘wage stop’, which was administered under discretion and regularly reviewed, the 
Household Benefit Cap is comprehensive and inflexible.  Most importantly, the ‘wage 
stop’ existed within a broader welfarist imaginary, whereas consent for the 
Household Benefit Cap has been consciously procured through anti-welfare 
commonsense. The Household Benefit Cap have been consistently legitimated via 
‘the taxpayer in work’ and as ‘delivering fairness’ to the taxpayer, and to ‘hardworking 
families’.  In so doing, the proponents of these anti-welfare policies dramatize a new 
classificatory politics around work/worklessness. Duncan-Smith has been a keen and 
consistent advocate for this substitution, giving several high-profile media interviews 
where he delineates between ‘hardworking families’ and ‘benefit brood’ families:   
The benefit cap has addressed the ludicrous situation we were in where 
people were receiving far more in benefits than the ordinary hardworking 
family earns. It is not right that before we introduced it some families could 
rake in more than double the amount that the average taxpayer takes home.  
(Duncan-Smith, cited in Chorley, 2014, our emphasis) 
One of the unusual aspects of the British Welfare state (in the European context), is 
that it is funded primarily through individual taxation, ‘rather than social insurance 
payments from employers, workers and government’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2012: 3). It is 
these financial arrangements that enable the ideological pitting of abstracted 
hardworking tax-payer against ‘benefits claimants’.  As Winlow and Hall (2013) rightly 
point out, the resurgence of an abstracted ‘taxpayer’ in times of austerity redraws 
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common economic interests between low-wage earners and extravagantly paid elite, 
rather than between low-wage earners and/or benefits claimants . Such newly drawn 
equivalences work to generate hard divisions between ‘universal benefits’, (such as 
the National Health Service, school-age education and pensions), and selective 
benefits (such as unemployment and disability benefits) and to divide people ‘along a 
vampiric axis of blame for diminishing social resources’ under ‘conditions of 
heightened precarity across a large swath of the class spectrum’ (Tyler, forthcoming). 
 
While one of the initial objectives for the Household Benefit Cap was ostensibly to 
‘deliver fiscal savings’ (DWP, 2012), when the detail of such savings came under 
question, welfare reform architect Lord Freud appeared to change tack and insisted 
that the message being sent by the Cap ‘is a behavioural one much more than a 
cost-based one’ (HL Deb 23 November 2011 GC421).  Indeed the vast bulk of of 
households – three quarters – have lost £100 per week or less under the Household 
Benefit Cap; small amounts in the grander welfare scheme, yet for each family this 
may mean hardship, eviction, displacement from schools, social networks and family.  
The DWP has resisted Freedom of Information requests about families who have 
been capped by higher amounts, though much of those cases will be 
disproportionately connected to higher housing costs in London and the South East. 
Such a behaviourist policy agenda is concerned with disciplining families, rather than 
‘fiscal restraint’ and the Household Benefit Cap is symptomatic of a wider 
“behaviourist turn” in policy formation, accompanied by an intensive social, political 
and media focus on “behaviourally recalcitrant” social groups (see Whitehead et al., 
2011). iii  Indeed, as Lynne Friedli and Robert Stearn have documented, neoliberal 
governmentality increasingly involves ‘the recruitment of psychology/psychologists 
into monitoring, modifying and/or punishing people who claim social security benefits’ 
(Friedli and Stearn, 2013).  
 
The Household Benefit Cap unravels, and effectively marks the end of state welfare 
grounded in assessed need, a shift that was described in the House of Lords by Lord 
Kirwood as ‘a direct and dangerous attack on entitlement and the concept of 
entitlement’ (HL Deb 21 November 2011 GC367).  In our analysis, the cultural 
political economy of disgust serves to draw a veil over the dissolving of a rights-
based understanding of state support for vulnerable populations, which was precisely 
the common, consensual basis of the creation of the welfare state in post-war 
Britain.iv   
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Conclusion: Combating Benefits Stigma 
Two recent influential accounts of the current accelerated round of welfare reform, 
Taylor-Gooby’s (2013) The Double-Crisis of the Welfare State and What We Can Do 
About It and John Hills’, Good Times, Bad Times: The Welfare Myth of Them and Us 
(2015) offer in-depth exegeses of the fracturing of consent for the welfare state. 
Drawing extensively on social survey data, these studies draw particular attention to 
the prevailing ‘welfare myths’ that underpin public support for the current round of 
welfare retrenchment. Hills, for example, argues that this welfare myth of ‘them and 
us’, has enabled the welfare state to be reimagined as an unaffordable system of 
provision for parasitical ‘benefit dependent others’; those in poverty, disabled people, 
those living in social housing and/or receiving unemployment benefits.  He details 
how programmes of cuts are legitimated by the myth that welfare provision 
disproportionately supports a minority population of ‘economically inactive’ people, 
rather than the ‘mass services’ of state provision from which the vast majority of 
citizens benefit. 
The hardening of public attitudes towards working-age benefits claimants in 
particular, such as families living with poverty and disabled people, marks a 
significant shift in public attitudes towards the welfare state. During previous 
recession periods, public support for welfare provisions increased as poverty and 
hardship became visible in everyday lives. In contrast, during the most recent 
economic downturn, there has been demonstrable and growing public support for 
cuts to state welfare programmes for working-age people. This is striking in a period 
of stagnating wages, insecure work and zero-hours contracts, and in a context of 
diminishing real-terms welfare benefits, rising poverty and poverty projections 
amongst vulnerable groups, such as children and disabled people (see for example 
Jara and Leventi, 2014) and a well-evidenced increase of dependence amongst low-
income groups on foodbanks and other charitable services to secure basic needs 
(Dowler and Lambie-Mumford, 2015).  
In seeking to explain the ascendance of what we have termed an anti-welfare 
commonsense, Taylor-Gooby and Hill draw particular attention to ‘evidence of 
escalating benefit stigma’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2014: 35) and in ‘the growing 
stigmatisation of poverty among people of working age’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2014: 36). 
This is further supported by ‘Benefits Stigma in Britain’ (Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney, 
2012), a major research study commissioned by the disability charity Turn2us, which 
details how claiming benefits has become increasingly stigmatized since the late 
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1990s, and more specifically how ‘the language and coverage’ of negative media 
depictions of benefits has substantially changed since 2008, with increasing 
emphasis on the deservedness of claimants and an increased reference to ‘large 
families on benefits, bad parenting, antisocial behaviour, people who have never 
worked or haven’t worked for a long time’ (Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney, 2012: 43). 
We follow Hills’ observation that a central challenge for social policy thinkers is how 
to challenge the hegemony of a hardening anti-welfare commonsense. However, 
while Hill, Taylor-Gooby and the authors of ‘Benefits Stigma in Britain’ offer ample 
evidence for the transformation of public opinion, there is an absence of attention on 
precisely how (and by whom) this benefits stigma is produced and sustained. It is the 
contention of this article that what is required is more critical accounts of the cultural 
mechanisms through which mass consent for welfare retrenchment is procured.  To 
this end, we have sought to demonstrate how “benefit brood” families condense a 
wide range of popular discontents with the welfare state, and have been configured 
and mobilised as emblems of a larger crisis of “welfare dependency”. We argue that 
this marks a shift from welfare imaginaries of the 1940s to the anti-welfare 
consensus of the political present tense. Such families form part of a wider cultural 
political economy of disgust used to dramatize ‘the giant evil of idleness’ (Brien, 
2010) and provide an ideological apparatus to secure consent for a punitive forms of 
welfare conditionality.  The Philpott case and its subsequent weaponisation by the 
architects of the Welfare Reform Act (2012), reveals the ways in which the crafting of 
‘revolting families’ (see Tyler 2013), as opposed to small, fiscally autonomous, ‘hard-
working’ families, is a central component of anti-welfare policy formation. Our central 
argument is these abject families are part of a wider and deeper cultural political 
economy, which has reshaped public understandings of the welfare state and incited 
consent for policies of impoverishment, such as the ‘Household Benefits Cap’ (2012). 
The task of a cultural political economy approach is to develop analytical tools ‘that 
allow for an understanding of these ideological inversions, displacements, and 
enemy-constructs’ (Rehmann, 2013: 4).  
The emergence, mediation and circulation of stigmatising depictions of “benefits 
broods” is symptomatic of how the truths of neoliberalism, such as escalating levels 
of child poverty, are transformed through media rituals into ‘acceptable versions’ of 
the values ‘on which that cruelty depends’ (Couldry, 2008: 3). While there have been 
some interruptions and fractures in the statecraft shifts from protective forms of 
welfare towards penal workfarist regimes since the 1970s, broadly these shifts have 
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continued unabated, and in the current ‘austerity’ moment under Coalition 
government they have intensified.   
In conclusion then, the cultural and political crafting of anti-welfare national abjects, 
by political and media elites highlights the need for critical policy research to be 
attentive to the intersections of cultural and political economies in the formation of an 
anti-welfare state consensus. If the progressive welfarist imaginary of the 1940s was 
grown through charitable and Government reports and publications, newspaper 
editorials and documentary films, then we need to pay critical attention to the 
mediating agencies that feed the public appetite for anti-welfarist reforms. Further, 
we need to attend to the struggles against this anti-welfare commonsense in the 
everyday lives of those effected by cuts to welfare provision.  What is at stake is the 
future of the welfare state itself as ‘cuts plus restructuring’ combine to fatally 
undermine ‘the political ideas and values supportive of an inclusive welfare state’ 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2014: 36).  Hills notes that, ‘misperception…is now one of the central 
challenges for those making and debating social policies and their future’ (2015: 
267). In this article we have sought to explicate how ‘misperceptions’ about state 
welfare are crafted to legitimate an anti-welfare commonsense. Through the 
unpicking of these mechanisms of consent it becomes possible to fracture this 
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